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 Military Child Custody Disputes: The Need for Federal Encouragement for the States’ 
Adoption of the Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act 
 
Amy C. Gromek* 
I. Introduction 
 When Michael Grantham, the primary physical custodian of his two children 
pursuant to a decree of dissolution, was called to active duty with the Iowa National Guard, 
he arranged for his children to reside with his mother.
1
  The children’s mother then filed a 
petition seeking permanent physical care of the children and temporary custody of the 
children pendente lite while Michael was away for service.
2
  Michael requested a stay of the 
custody proceedings under the applicable law until he returned to civilian status, but the 
district court denied the request.
3
  Ultimately, with Michael in attendance, the district court 
ruled that permanent physical care of the children should be changed from Michael to his 
ex-wife.
4
  The court of appeals reversed and emphasized how “[a]s a result of the judgment 
of the district court, a soldier, who answered our Nations call to defend, lost physical care of 
his children because he was ‘obliged to drop [his] own affairs to take up the burdens of the 
nation.’”5  The Iowa Supreme Court, however, reinstated the district court’s ruling, agreeing 
that circumstances had significantly changed since the entry of the dissolution decree and 
the children’s mother was presently the most effective parent to both children.6   
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1
 In re Marriage of Grantham, 698 N.W.2d 140, 142–43 (Iowa 2005).  
2
 Id. at 143.  
3
 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 In re Marriage of Grantham, 695 N.W.2d 43 (Iowa Ct. App. 2004).  
6
 In re Marriage of Grantham, 698 N.W.2d 140, 146–47 (Iowa 2005).  
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 In February 2003, Eva Crouch, a member of the Kentucky National Guard, was 
ordered to report to active federal duty within 72 hours.
7
  In this short time frame, she made 
arrangements to transfer physical custody of her child to her ex-husband for the duration of 
her active deployment—an arrangement that both parties intended to be temporary.8  Eva 
was mobilized and deployed to Fort Knox, Kentucky for one year.
9
  In 2004, she contacted 
her ex-husband to arrange for reassuming physical custody of their child.
10
  Her ex-husband, 
however, refused to transfer physical custody without a court order.
11
  The trial court instead 
entered an order finding that it was in the child’s best interests to remain with the father.12  
After two years of litigation and about $25,000 in legal fees,
13
 Eva regained custody of her 
child when the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the order made prior to Eva Crouch’s 
deployment was temporary and, therefore, not a modification of the prior permanent custody 
order.
14
  In a subsequent comment to the media, Eva said, “I’d have spent a million 
[dollars].  My child was my life ... I go serve my country, and I come back and have to go 
through hell and high water.”15 
 These cases, along with several other stories documented in the news in recent 
years,16 portray how child custody disputes involving members of active military service 
                                                        
7
 Crouch v. Crouch, 201 S.W.3d 463, 464 (Ky. 2006). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11
 Id. 
12
 Id.  
13
 Deployed Troops Fight for Lost Custody of Kids, NBCNEWS.COM, May 5, 2007, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18506417/. 
14 Crouch, 201 S.W.3d at 464–65.  
15
 Deployed Troops Fight for Lost Custody of Kids, supra note 13. 
16 See id; see also Michelle Miller, Military Parents Fight for Custody at Home, CBSNEWS.COM, Dec. 16, 
2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-18563_162-5972251.html; see also David Kocieniewski, Soldier’s 
Service Leads to a Custody Battle at Home, N.Y. TIMES, August 31, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/01/nyregion/01guard.html?pagewanted=all.; see also Ann Scott Tyson, 
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have the potential to become unpleasant and costly by-products of active military duty.  
Since October 2001, there have been unprecedented levels of deployment and increased 
reliance on Reserve and Guard members.
17
  With the United States’ ongoing involvement in 
conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the inadequacies of legal protections for military 
servicemembers who are single and divorced, many of whom maintain physical custody of 
their children prior to deployment, have come to the forefront of discussion and political 
debate.
18
  While some sources have drawn attention to the stories of servicemember-mothers 
involved in custody battles as a result of military deployment,
19
 the problem is one that 
transcends gender lines.  In effect, “single parents in uniform fight a war on two fronts: For 
the nation they are sworn to defend, and for the children they are losing because of that 
duty.”20 
 The federal Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (“SCRA”) provides procedural 
protections for servicemembers, such as staying child custody proceedings for at least 90 
days if the active-duty servicemember meets particular conditions,21 but it does not address 
the impact that a servicemember’s deployment may have on future custody determinations.  
In the past several years, many states have implemented laws designed to protect 
servicemembers in child custody and visitation cases, but these laws are not consistent 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Deployment Being Used Against Parents in Child Custody Battles, THE WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 30, 2008, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/29/AR2008122902611.html.  
17 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF DEPLOYMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES ON 
THEIR DEPENDENT CHILDREN 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.militaryhomefront.dod.mil/12038/Project%20Documents/MilitaryHOMEFRONT/Reports/Report_
to_Congress_on_Impact_of_Deployment_on_Military_Children.pdf.   
18
 Senators Still Skeptical of Federal Child Custody Protections, REUTERS, June 25, 2012, available at 2012 
WLNR 14268077. 
19 Rachelle L. Paquin, Note, Defining the "Fit": The Impact of Gender and Servicemember Status on Child 
Custody Determinations, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 533, 574–75 (2011). 
20
 Deployed Troops Fight for Lost Custody of Kids, supra note 13.  
21
 See generally Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 108–189, 177 Stat. 2835 (2003) (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 501–594 (2006)).  
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across the country.
22
  In July 2012, the Uniform Law Commission
23
 (“ULC”) granted final 
approval to the Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act, which state legislatures could 
adopt to standardize custody rights for deployed servicemembers.
24
  Since 2008, however, 
proponents of federal legislation have proposed that Congress should amend the SCRA to 
provide greater legal protection for servicemembers in child custody disputes.
25
 
 In Parts II and III, this Comment will examine military policy regarding single-
parent service and state-court efforts to address child custody issues for single-parent 
servicemembers.  Part IV will look to the current Servicemembers Civil Relief Act and 
Congressman Michael Turner’s proposed amendments to the federal legislation.  Part V will 
analyze the benefits and shortcomings of the ULC’s Deployed Parents Custody and 
Visitation Act.  Finally, Part VI will argue that Congress should defer to the approach 
proposed by the Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act but that Congress should 
make funding for welfare contingent on states’ adoption of the uniform law in order to 
encourage its adoption in all states.  
II. Background and Military Policy Regarding Single-Parent Service 
 
                                                        
22 Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act Summary, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Deployed%20Parents%20Custody%20and%20Visitatio
n%20Act (last visited Oct. 27, 2012). 
23 The ULC is a group of practicing lawyers, judges, legislators and legislative staff, and law professors who 
have been appointed by state governments to research, draft, and promote enactment of uniform state laws. 
UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=About%20the%20ULC (last 
visited February 13, 2013).  
24 Panel: Improve Child Custody Rules for Military, USATODAY.COM, July 18, 2012, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/story/2012-07-18/military-child-custody/56294984/1.  
25 Letter from Michael R. Turner and Robert Andrews, Members of Congress, to Leon Panetta, U.S. Sec’y of 
Defense (Mar. 29, 2012), available at 
http://turner.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hasc_child_custody_letter_to_secretary_panetta_-_3-29-12.pdf; see also 
Senators Still Skeptical of Federal Child Custody Protections, supra note 18. 
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 In addressing military child custody matters, it is first necessary to consider the 
military’s underlying policies and regulations concerning single-parent service.  Department 
of Defense Instruction 1304.26 provides in pertinent part: “The Military Services may not 
enlist married individuals with more than two dependents under the age of 18 or unmarried 
individuals with custody of any dependents under the age of 18.”26  The Air Force 
Recruiting Service has specifically emphasized that an unmarried applicant who has 
physical or legal custody of a family member incapable of self-care “does not have the 
flexibility required to perform worldwide duty, short-notice TDY, remote tours, and varied 
duty hours.”27  As such, an applicant falling into this category is ineligible for enlistment 
unless permanent physical and legal custody has been transferred by court order.
28
 
Although this enlistment restriction exists across all branches of the armed services, 
married individuals who are already serving in the military sometimes become single 
parents, by way of divorce or death of spouse.  As of 2009, there were a total of 74,754 
single parent active-duty members in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force 
combined.
29
  There were 77,181 single parents serving in the Selected Reserves, which 
includes Guard components as well as the Reserve components and the Coast Guard 
Reserve.
30
  Out of the servicemembers who deployed to Operation Enduring 
                                                        
26
 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 1304.26, QUALIFICATION STANDARDS FOR ENLISTMENT, 
APPOINTMENT, AND INDUCTION 8 (2005), available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/130426p.pdf (emphasis added). See also U.S. Dep’t of Army, 
Reg. 601-210, Active and Reserve Components Enlistment Program 11 (2011); U.S. Dep’t of Navy, MCO 
P1100.72C, Military Personnel Procurement Manual, Volume 2: Enlisted Procurement 3-37 (2004); Air Force 
Recruiting Service, Instruction 36-2001, Recruiting Procedures for the Air Force 49 (2012).  
27 Air Force Recruiting Service, Instruction 36-2001, supra note 26. 
28 Id. 
29 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEMOGRAPHICS 2009: PROFILE OF THE MILITARY COMMUNITY 64 (2009), available at 
http://www.militaryhomefront.dod.mil/12038/Project%20Documents/MilitaryHOMEFRONT/QOL%20Resour
ces/Reports/2009_Demographics_Report.pdf. 
30
 Id. at 128.  
 5 
Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom, single parents make up 17 percent, according to 2010 
data.
31
 
Considering the practical difficulties presented when military servicemembers are 
responsible for the care of dependents, the military has implemented ways to standardize the 
family-care requirements for all of the military services.  Department of Defense Instruction 
Number 1342.19 provides that “[a]ll Service members . . . shall plan for contingencies in the 
care and support of dependent family members, and shall develop and submit a family care 
plan within the timeliness set forth in this Instruction.”32  The Army, for example, 
emphasizes how plans must be made “to ensure Family members are properly and 
adequately cared for when the Soldier is deployed, on [temporary duty], or otherwise not 
available due to military requirements.”33  Despite the necessity of these plans for single 
military parents, the Family Care Plan (“FCP”) as mandated under Instruction Number 
1342.19 is notably not a legal document that can change a court-mandated custodial 
arrangement.
34
  The FCP’s “sole purpose” is to document for the military how soldiers plan 
to provide for the care of their family members when military duties call.
35
  The FCP must 
include proof that the servicemember has obtained consent to the planned designation of 
guardianship from all parties with a legal interest in the custody and care of the minor child, 
                                                        
31 REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF DEPLOYMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES ON THEIR DEPENDENT 
CHILDREN, supra note 17, at 13.  Notably, the Department of Defense would likely never extend Instruction 
1304.26 to cover servicemember parents who become single by divorce or death of a spouse because, along 
with conveying a severe lack of sensitivity, this measure would surely mean the actual loss of a considerable 
number of current servicemembers. 
32
 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 1342.19, FAMILY CARE PLANS 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/134219p.pdf. 
33
 U.S. Dep’t of Army, Reg. 600-20, Army Command Policy 5-5 (2008). 
34
 Id.  
35
 Id. 
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or, alternatively, “proof that reasonable efforts have been made to obtain consent to such 
designation.”36  
In sum, because a FCP lacks overall legal enforceability, it is of little assistance if a 
custody dispute erupts between a deployed servicemember, who created the plan, and a non-
military party with legally enforceable custody rights.
37
  If the non-military, non-custodial 
natural or adoptive parent challenges the FCP and seeks to modify the custody status of the 
child in court, the FCP has no legally binding effect.  Some states have made efforts to 
provide greater legal protections for the rights of deployed military personnel in the child 
custody context.
38
  Part III will explore these efforts and the associated problems and 
shortcomings.  
III. State-Court Efforts to Address Child Custody Issues for Returning Servicemembers 
 
Single-parent servicemembers who arrange for temporary custody of their children, 
often through FCPs, and plan to resume physical custody following deployment face certain 
legal complications.  On the most basic level, there is a tension at times between state family 
law’s “best interests of the child” standard and the servicemember’s interest in resuming 
custody of his or her child.  
A. “Best Interests of the Child” Framework and Custody Modification 
In 2000, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions 
                                                        
36
 Id. (emphasis added).  
37 Shawn P. Ayotte, Note, Protecting Servicemembers from Unfair Custody Decisions While Preserving the 
Child’s Best Interests, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 655, 662 (2011). 
38 See Jeffrey P. Sexton & Jonathan Brent, Child Custody and Deployments: The States Step in to Fill the 
SCRA Gap, ARMY LAW, December 2008, at 9, 11. 
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concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.
39
  In general, courts aim to make 
decisions in accordance with the best interest of the child while remaining within 
constitutional parameters.
40
  Courts will typically look to a variety of factors to determine 
what is in the child’s best interest when making a custody determination.41  The Uniform 
Marriage and Divorce Act, though enacted in only a handful of states, codifies factors that 
are commonly relied upon in most jurisdictions.
42
  These factors include, but are not limited 
to, the following: (1) the wishes of the child’s parent or parents as to his custody; (2) the 
wishes of the child as to his custodian; (3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child 
with his parent or parents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect 
the child’s best interest; (4) the child’s adjustment to his home, school, and community and 
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
43
  
Most courts will modify a custody decision only if there is a “substantial change in 
circumstances.”44  States vary, however, on the specific requirements to obtain a hearing and 
the standards used for modification.
45
  For example, the Supreme Court of Florida has held 
that a two-part substantial change test applies to modification of all child custody 
agreements: the movant seeking modification of custody must show both that the 
circumstances have substantially and materially changed since the original custody 
                                                        
39 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) 
(“liberty” under the Due Process Clause includes the right of the individual to “establish a home and bring up 
children”), and Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (discussing “the liberty of parents 
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”). 
40 WALTER WADLINGTON AND RAYMOND C. O’BRIEN, FAMILY LAW IN PERSPECTIVE 7 (3d ed. 2012).   
41
 JUDITH AREEN ET. AL., FAMILY LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 768 (6th ed. 2012). 
42
 See Unif. Marriage & Divorce Act § 402 (amended 1973). 
43 Id.  
44 JUDITH AREEN ET. AL., supra note 41, at 948.  
45 LINDA ELROD, CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 17:1 (Westlaw 2012).  
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determination and that the child's best interests justify changing custody.
46
  The substantial 
change must be one that was not reasonably contemplated at the time of the original 
judgment.
47
  In Alaska, an award of custody of a child or visitation with the child “may be 
modified if the court determines that a change in circumstances requires the modification of 
the award and the modification is in the best interests of the child.”48   
One risk associated with these standards in the context of military servicemember 
custody disputes is that “the court will view the servicemember’s military profession, and 
the possibility of future deployments, as a detrimental factor when determining what 
custody solution would be in the ‘best interest’ of the child.”49  This can be attributed to the 
emphasis courts generally place on assuring continuity for the child,
50
 and the fact that 
military service can involve mobilization and deployment that disrupts continuity and 
stability.
51
  In recent years, state legislatures have been enacting child custody protections 
for servicemembers,
52
 some of which aim to address this potential risk and to provide 
greater protection for servicemembers’ interests.53  The ULC, however, has identified 
several persistent problems.
54
  
B. State variations in Child Custody Laws For Servicemembers 
 The ULC has pointed out significant variation in states’ approaches to custody issues 
raised by a parent’s deployment, including how some courts will grant custody to the other 
                                                        
46 Wade v. Hirschman, 903 So. 2d 928, 932 (Fla. 2005).  
47 Id.  
48 ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.20.110 (West 2012). 
49 Sexton & Brent, supra note 38, at 9.  
50
 JUDITH AREEN ET. AL., supra note 41, at 769.  
51 See generally Ayotte, supra note 37, at 672.  
52
 Christopher Missick, Comment, Child Custody Protections in the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act: 
Congress Acts to Protect Parents Serving in the Armed Forces, 29 WHITTIER L. REV. 857, 875 (2008).   
53 See infra notes 59, 60, 64 and accompanying text.  
54
 See Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act Summary, supra note 22. 
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legal parent for the duration of the deployment, sometimes over the wishes of the deploying 
parent, while other courts will grant custody to the person that the servicemember wishes to 
designate as custodian (i.e. a grandparent).
55
  Importantly, the ULC also notes that some 
courts will not overturn a “temporary” custody arrangement granted to the non-deployed 
parent when the servicemember returns “unless the child is shown to be significantly worse 
off living with the non-deployed natural parent.”56  This standard, of course, presents 
extreme difficulties for most deployed parents to satisfy.  This is because, as one scholar put 
it, “The soldier is at a disadvantage in a custody suit brought before the court either during 
or after deployment, because the other parent has often gained an advantage by being the 
custodial parent during the deployment.”57  The non-servicemember parent “is the last 
person to have created and maintained the child’s home and community connections.”58  
A look at the laws of just a few states demonstrates the inconsistency among their 
laws on this complex issue.  For example, Kentucky’s statute states that any court-ordered 
modification of a child custody decree based, in whole or in part, on the active duty of a 
parent deployed outside the United States or federal active duty shall be temporary and 
revert back to the previous child custody decree at the end of the deployment or federal 
active duty, as appropriate.
59
  Noticeably, the statute does not address or prohibit 
deployment itself as a consideration during a best interests determination.   
                                                        
55 Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act Summary, supra note 22. 
56 Id. 
57 Darrell Baughn, Divorce & Deployment: Representing the Military Servicemember, FAM. ADVOC., Fall 
2005, at 8, 12.  
58
 Ayotte, supra note 37, at 672.  
59 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.340(5)(2) (West 2012) (emphasis added). 
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By contrast, Arizona’s statute covers similar, yet additional, ground.60  According to 
the statute, if a parent with whom the child resides a majority of the time is deployed, a 
court shall not enter a final order modifying a preexisting order until ninety days after the 
deployment ends, unless a modification is agreed to by the deploying parent.
61
  Moreover, a 
court “shall not consider a parent's absence caused by deployment or mobilization or the 
potential for future deployment or mobilization as the sole factor supporting a real, 
substantial and unanticipated change in circumstances pursuant to this section.”62  All 
temporary modification orders must include a specific transition schedule to facilitate a 
return to the pre-deployment order within ten days after the deployment ends, however, 
“taking into consideration the child's best interests.”63  
South Dakota’s statute64 is comprehensive.  There is a noticeable difference between 
its provision regarding assessment of past or future deployment in considering a substantial 
and material change of circumstances and Arizona’s provision.  Under the South Dakota 
statute, a servicemember ordered to deployment, who is the physical custodian of a minor, 
may delegate by a power of attorney to another person for a period of one year or less any of 
the powers regarding care and custody of the minor child.
65
  Notably, “[n]either the 
execution of such a power of attorney pursuant to this section, nor the deployment itself, 
may be considered a factor in considering a substantial and material change of 
circumstances, nor a factor in a best interest of the child determination for purposes of 
                                                        
60 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-411 (2012) (West). 
61 § 25-411(B).   
62 § 25-411(C) (emphasis added). 
63 § 25-411(H). 
64
 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 33-6-10 (2012). 
65 § 33-6-10. 
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permanent child custody modification proceedings.”66  This contrasts with Arizona’s statute, 
which states that a court shall not consider absence caused by deployment or the potential 
for future deployment as the sole factor supporting a real, substantial, and unanticipated 
change in circumstances.
67
  South Dakota’s statute also includes a provision for an 
automatic stay of all proceedings seeking a permanent change in custody of a minor child 
where the parent with physical custody is a servicemember called to active duty for 
deployment.
68
  Such a stay shall continue for the period of service due to deployment, unless 
waived in writing by the servicemember.
69
  Furthermore, any temporary order modifying 
physical custody of the child automatically terminates when the servicemember returns from 
deployment and reverts back to the custody status in effect prior to the deployment.
70
  If, 
however, upon the servicemember’s return from the deployment either the servicemember 
or child “exhibits a substantial and material change in circumstances which adversely affects 
the servicemember's ability to adequately care for the child, the best interests of the child 
shall be determinative.”71  Thus, while Kentucky and South Dakota both use the specific 
language “revert back,” South Dakota’s statute provides much more detail on when this 
should happen, whereas Kentucky simply states “as appropriate.”72  
As just these three state statutes show, there is considerable variation among state 
attempts to provide guidance and, in some ways, greater protections for servicemembers 
who prior to deployment maintained physical custody of their minor children.  Some states, 
                                                        
66 § 33-6-10 (emphasis added).  
67 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.  
68 § 33-6-10. 
69
 § 33-6-10. 
70 § 33-6-10. 
71
 § 33-6-10. 
72
 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.  
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the ULC reports, have not even adopted any statutes on this issue.
73
 Overall, the variation in 
the states creates a “patchwork of laws,”74 which, as the following Parts of this Comment 
will discuss, is highly problematic.  
IV. The SCRA and the Turner Amendment: A Federal Attempt to Strengthen Protections for 
Military Servicemembers 
 
 At the state level, there exists a serious lack in uniformity of legislation that 
addresses custody matters for single-parent servicemembers.  This lack of uniformity in 
custody laws specifically addressing servicemembers is problematic due to the unique 
nature of military work.  Military service is not only especially mobile in nature, but it is 
also necessary for national protection.  Arguably, greater predictability and uniformity is 
needed for servicemember child custody laws because the states’ variant laws make it 
“difficult for [military] parents to resolve these important issues quickly and fairly [and] 
hurt[] the ability of deploying parents to serve the country effectively [.]”75  Unfortunately, 
current federal law also proves inadequate to fully address servicemembers’ custody 
interests.  
A. Problems with the Current SCRA 
 The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (“SCRA”) is federal legislation enacted in 
2003 aimed at protecting certain legal rights of United States servicemembers.
76
  Congress 
passed the SCRA to clarify and revise the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act 
                                                        
73 Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act Summary, supra note 22. 
74
 Missick, supra note 52, at 875.  
75
 Why States Should Adopt the Uniform Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act, UNIFORM LAW 
COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Docs/Deployed_Parents/UDPCVA%20Why%20States(1).pdf (last visited 
February 15, 2013).  
76
 See Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 108-189, 177 Stat. 2835 (2003) (codified as amended at 
50 U.S.C. app. §§ 501–594 (2006)).  
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(“SSCRA”).77  The SSCRA essentially “gave trial courts discretion to grant relief when a 
litigant’s military status would materially affect the servicemember’s ability to protect his or 
her legal rights or comply with the obligation in question.”78  Under the current SCRA, the 
court shall, upon application by the servicemember, stay any civil action or proceeding, 
including any child custody proceeding, for a period of not less than 90 days if the particular 
application conditions are met.
79
  An application must include a letter or other 
communication stating the manner in which current military duty requirements materially 
affect the servicemember’s ability to appear and a letter or communication from the 
servicemember’s commanding officer stating that the servicemember’s current military duty 
prevents appearance.
80
  One of the stated purposes of the SCRA is “to provide for, 
strengthen, and expedite the national defense through protection extended by [the] Act to 
servicemembers . . . to enable such persons to devote their entire energy to the defense needs 
of the Nation.”81  The SCRA’s protections apply to active-duty members of the Army, 
Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard as well as National Guard members called 
to active service.
82
 
 Despite the procedural protection the SCRA provides for servicemembers, scholars 
have identified several pitfalls of the SCRA in its current state.  First, the SCRA does not 
                                                        
77
 Paquin, supra note 19, at 545.  
78 Sara Estrin, Article, The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act: Why and How This Act Applies to Child Custody 
Proceedings, 27 LAW & INEQ. 211, 214 (2009), citing Mark S. Cohen, Entitlement to a Stay or Default 
Judgment Relief Under the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act, 35 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 323, 333 
(2007).  
79 § 522. Notably, in 2008 Section 202(a) of the SCRA (now 50 U.S.C. App. § 522(a)) was amended by 
inserting, “including any child custody proceeding,” after what had originally said only “civil action or 
proceeding.” Similarly, Section 201(a) of the SCRA (now 50 U.S.C. App. § 521(a)), pertaining to protection of 
servicemembers against default judgments, was amended by inserting, “including any child custody 
proceeding,” after “proceeding.” National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
181, § 584, 122 Stat. 3, 128 (2008); see also Missick, supra note 52, at 874.  
80
 § 522. 
81 § 502. 
82 § 511. 
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require courts to grant stays for the duration of a servicemember’s deployment.83  The 
language of the SCRA provides only “for a period of not less than 90 days.”84  Next, though 
the SCRA purports to stay custody proceedings until the servicemember can participate in 
the litigation, case law has shown that courts have “sidestepped the SCRA” by issuing 
temporary custody orders despite the SCRA’s mandated stays.85  For example, in Tallon v. 
DaSilva, a mother and father shared physical custody of their child.
86
  When the father was 
deployed on active military service, he executed a power of attorney to assign his custody 
rights to his mother (the child’s grandmother).87  In an emergency motion, the mother 
requested that the court enter an interim order awarding her primary physical and legal 
custody pending the father's return from deployment.
88
  The court acknowledged that the 
stay provision of the SCRA necessarily applies to custody cases.
89
  The court then asserted 
that “a child does not exist in ‘suspended animation’ during the pendency of any stay 
entered pursuant to the SCRA” and that “the issue of the child's custody during a parent's 
deployment must perforce be addressed.”90  The court awarded temporary primary custody 
to the mother while the father was deployed.
91
  
Similarly, in Lenser v. McGowan, a mother and father were living separately but 
were not yet divorced.
92
  The paternal grandmother was caring for the child when the circuit 
                                                        
83 Sexton & Brent, supra note 38, at 9–10. 
84 § 522. 
85
 Ayotte, supra note 37, at 670.  
86 Tallon v. DaSilva, No. FD02-4291-003 (Ct. Com. Pl. Allegheny Cnty., Pa. 2005), reprinted in 153 
PITTSBURGH LEGAL J. 164, 165 (2005). 
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88
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89 Id.  
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Lenser v. McGowan, 191 S.W.3d 506, 507 (2004).  
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court entered a temporary custody order awarding custody to the mother.
93
  The circuit court 
actually entered this temporary custody order before it entered the SCRA stay for the 
servicemember father.
94
   The Supreme Court of Arkansas, however, held that even if the 
stay had been in place when the temporary custody was considered, it would not have 
prevented the circuit court from issuing the order.
95
  It reasoned that the stay of the SCRA 
“does not freeze a case in permanent limbo and leave a circuit court with no authority to act 
at all.”96 
While a temporary order of custody in favor of the non-servicemember may not 
seem especially unfair to the servicemember parent, these temporary orders are increasingly 
apt to become permanent.
97
  This is because “stability” and “connection” often carry 
significant weight in a subsequent custody battle.
98
  As one scholar puts it, “The end result is 
that the non-servicemember parent is able to use the servicemember parent’s absence to 
initiate proceedings for temporary custody that ultimately culminate in a permanent custody 
order.”99  Additionally, despite the SCRA’s procedural protections, in some states a 
servicemember’s past or future deployment itself may have a substantive impact on future 
custody determinations if it is considered as a “best interest” factor.100  Some may argue that 
                                                        
93 Id. 
94
 Id. at 509.  
95 Id. at 511.  
96
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98 Id. at 672. 
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 Sexton & Brent, supra note 38, at 11; see also Child Custody Bill Executive Summary, CONGRESSMAN 
MICHAEL TURNER, 
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this is necessary, particularly where, for example, the child was very young when the parent 
was deployed and it would be destabilizing to change the custody arrangement.
101
  There is 
a difference, however, between using a servicemember’s past or future deployment itself as 
a sort of automatic strike against the servicemember in a best interests determination and a 
consideration of any significant impact on the best interests of the child of the parent’s past 
or possible future deployment.  A servicemember parent is at least given a chance at 
establishing there has been no significant impact on the child with the latter option, whereas 
with the former this chance is absolutely precluded.   
B. Amendment Proposal for the SCRA 
 Congressman Michael Turner (R-Ohio) has proposed a bill to amend the 
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act.
102
  According to Turner, “It’s a disservice to our military 
personnel to think their leadership does not value their commitment enough to provide 
needed federal child-custody protection while on active duty. . . . Penalizing a service 
member for their performance of duty is unfair and a dishonor to our military parents who 
freely give so much to this nation.”103  Turner’s bill (i) prohibits state courts from using past 
deployments or the possibility of deployment against servicemembers when making child 
custody determinations, (ii) prohibits courts from permanently altering custody orders 
during a parent’s deployment, and (iii) requires pre-deployment custody to be reinstated 
unless that is not in the best interest of the child.
104
   
C. Political Hurdles 
                                                                                                                                                                          
http://turner.house.gov/uploadedfiles/turner_one_page_executive_summary_on_child_custody_bill_final.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2012). 
101
 See generally Ayotte, supra note 37, at 672.  
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104
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 Since 2008, Congressman Turner’s legislative language addressing this issue has 
passed the House of Representatives six times as part of the National Defense Authorization 
Act,
105
 including as a section of the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 4310.
106
  
In 2008, the language passed the House as a stand-alone bill (H.R. 6048) by voice vote.
107
  
Additionally, on May 30, 2012, the House also passed a stand-alone version of the bill, H.R. 
4201: Servicemember Family Protection Act.
108
  It was approved by a 390-2 vote.
 109 
 Nevertheless, the Senate Armed Services Committee remains unconvinced of the 
need for federal legislative amendment.
110
  In its June 4, 2012 report on its version of the 
2013 National Defense Authorization Act, the Senate Armed Services Committee asserted 
that “[a] federal legal standard would preempt the efforts of the States over a matter 
traditionally left to State courts.”111  The Senate Armed Services Committee directed the 
Secretary of Defense to request the “views and recommendations” of the Council of 
Governors regarding legislative proposals to amend Title II of the SCRA or “otherwise to 
establish federal law that would prohibit State courts from considering the absence of a 
service member by reason of deployment, or the possibility of deployment, in determining 
the best interest of the child in cases involving child custody.”112  The Senate Armed 
Services Committee requested the Secretary to ensure that the views and recommendations 
                                                        
105
 Letter from Michael R. Turner and Robert Andrews, supra note 25; see also Senators Still Skeptical of 
Federal Child Custody Protections, supra note 18. 
106 See H.R. 4310: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, GOVTRACK.US, 
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of the Council of Governors are submitted to the Committees on Armed Services and 
Committees on Veterans’ Affairs of the Senate and the House of Representatives no later 
than March 1, 2013.
113
 
 The Department of Defense has also opposed federal child-custody protections for 
servicemembers.
114
  A Department of Defense statement asserted the following:
115
  
The Department of Defense opposes efforts to create Federal child custody 
legislation affecting Service members . . . By encouraging each State to 
address the issues within the context of their already-existing body of State 
law, these cases will proceed quicker and more smoothly with less likelihood 
of lengthy appellate review. We strongly believe that Federal legislation in 
this area of the law, which has historically and almost exclusively been 
handled by the States, would be counterproductive. 
 
In 2011, however, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was reported to have sent a letter 
to Congressman Michael Turner indicating his changed position.
116
  Turner stated in his 
February 18, 2011 press release that Gates wrote he believed the Department of Defense 
should change its position to one that was “willing to consider whether appropriate 
legislation can be crafted that provides Service members with a federal uniform standard of 
protection in cases where it is established that military service is the sole factor involved in a 
child custody decision involving a Service member[.]”117    
 In a March 29, 2012, letter to the current Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, 
Congressmen Michael Turner and Robert Andrews enclosed the letter from Secretary Gates 
                                                        
113
 Id. 
114 Michael R. Turner, Op-Ed., supra note 103. 
115 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POSITION 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/DOD_position_child_custody.pdf. 
116
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117 Press Release, Congressman Michael Turner, Gates Joins Turner in Fight for Service Member Child 
Custody Rights (Feb. 18, 2011), available at 
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 19 
and stated that they looked forward to the same level of support.
118
  During a Joint House 
Armed Services and Veterans’ Affairs Committee Hearing on July 25, 2012, Turner raised 
the legislation to Secretary Panetta, who replied, “I support the efforts that you’ve made.  
You’ve provided tremendous leadership on this issue, and I will do the same with regards to 
the amendments on the Senate side.”119  Other than these brief hearing comments, however, 
the current level of support from the Department of Defense for Congressman Turner’s 
proposal is unclear.   
 Meanwhile, opinions from some expert associations and individuals have been 
particularly critical toward Congressman Turner’s proposed legislation.  Many of these 
concerns are grounded in federalism.  For example, Patricia Apy, on behalf of the American 
Bar Association (“ABA”), gave a four-point testimony to the House Committee on 
Veterans’ Affairs on February 25, 2010 regarding the ABA’s opposition to the bill.  Her 
prepared statement included the argument that by amending the SCRA to accomplish its 
aims, the bill “will unintentionally but surely introduce federal litigation to a matter reserved 
to the states and in which the federal government has no expertise.”120  Expressing similar 
sentiments in his statement, Retired Army JAG Colonel Mark E. Sullivan
121
 asserted that 
“[t]he passage of an overarching gridwork of Federal law in a field which has always been 
reserved for the states will completely destroy the initiative of those states which are 
                                                        
118 Letter from Michael R. Turner and Robert Andrews, supra note 25. 
119 Back from the Battlefield: DOD and VA Collaboration to Assist Service Members Returning to Civilian 
Life: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Armed Services and H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 112th Congress 
(2012), available at http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings-display?ContentRecord_id=d6cf0b67-
de1b-468e-8114-4152fdae2122&ContentType_id=14f995b9-dfa5-407a-9d35-
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considering initial legislation or thinking about improving their current laws to protect 
military members and their children.”122 
 Ultimately, though Congressman Turner’s proposed SCRA amendment is well 
meaning, it is highly unlikely that his approach will ever be successful due to the political 
impasse.  Since 2008, Congressman Turner’s proposed legislative language has passed in 
the House eight times, yet all eight times it has been subsequently rejected in the Senate.
123
  
Without sufficient support in Congress and from family law experts for the amended SCRA, 
another more realistic solution must be implemented.    
V. Analysis of the Uniform Law Commission’s Proposal: the Deployed Parents Custody and 
Visitation Act 
 
Given concerns about an amendment to the SCRA, some critics have instead 
endorsed the ULC’s recent proposal.124  The ULC has set forth the Uniform Deployed 
Parents Custody and Visitation Act (“UDPCVA”) to address the states’ “patchwork of 
rules.”  The ULC consists of more than 300 commissioners, including lawyers and judges, 
who are appointed by state governments to draft and propose statutes in areas of the law 
where uniformity among the states is desirable.
125
  The Commission approved and 
recommended the UDPCVA for enactment in all the states at the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws’ annual conference held July 13-19, 2012.126 
A. The Proposed UDPCVA 
                                                        
122 Hearing on H.R. 4469 Before the Subcomm. on Economic Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Veterans’ 
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 UNIF. DEPLOYED PARENTS CUSTODY AND VISITATION ACT §§ 101–504 (2012), available at 
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 The UDPCVA, as proposed by the ULC, is organized into five articles.
127
  Article 1 
notably provides that in a proceeding for custodial responsibility of a servicemember’s 
child, a court may not consider a parent’s past deployment or possible future deployment in 
itself in determining the best interest of the child, but may consider any significant impact 
on the best interest of the child of the parent’s past or possible future deployment.128  
Articles 2 and 3 address two distinct possible scenarios.  Article 2 provides a procedure for 
parents who agree to a custody arrangement during deployment and enter into a “temporary 
agreement.”129  Article 3 establishes that, in the absence of such an agreement, a court may 
issue a temporary order granting custodial responsibility after a deploying parent receives 
notice of deployment and during the deployment.
130
  Under Article 3, however, a court may 
not issue a permanent order granting custodial responsibility without the consent of the 
deploying parent.
131
  Article 4 addresses return from deployment. The article contains 
procedures for when the parents agree that the temporary custody agreement formed 
pursuant to Article 2 should be terminated, procedures for when the parents agree that the 
temporary custody order formed pursuant to Article 3 should be terminated, and procedures 
for when there is no parental agreement regarding the termination of the temporary custody 
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arrangement.
132
  Lastly, Article 5 contains miscellaneous provisions, such as an effective 
date provision and a transition provision.
133
  
B. The Advantages of Adopting the UDPCVA 
The UDPCVA approach will help to provide greater protections for servicemembers 
in custody matters.  The UDPCVA provides that a court may not consider a parent’s past 
deployment or possible future deployment in itself in determining the best interest of the 
child, but may consider any significant impact on the best interest of the child of the parent’s 
past or possible future deployment.
134
  A Comment to the UDPCVA provides greater insight 
into what is meant by “significant” impact:135  
The term “significant” is meant to exclude the court’s considering trivial 
impact of a parent’s deployment, such as the need to enroll a child in a 
different school.  Under this standard, the court may only consider impacts 
that are material or substantial.  For example, the court may consider that the 
child has bonded closely with step-siblings while in a temporary custody 
arrangement during a deployment, or that the child does not adjust well to new 
situations and therefore will likely have difficulty relocating if a parent is 
deployed in the future.  
 
Accordingly, the UDPCVA is helpful to servicemembers because using deployment 
itself as a best interests factor necessarily works against the servicemember.  The court may 
still consider “any significant impact” of the deployment on the best interests of the child.  
The court, however, may not consider trivial impact of a parent’s deployment, which again 
works to the advantage of the servicemember.  
                                                        
132 UNIF. DEPLOYED PARENTS CUSTODY AND VISITATION ACT §§ 101–504 (2012), available at 
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Under Article 4 of the UDPCVA, in the event that the parents do not agree on 
whether to terminate a temporary custody arrangement established by court order, the 
custody arrangement terminates 60 days after the deploying parent gives notice to the other 
parent that the deploying parent returned from deployment.
136
  As the ULC’s Comment 
points out, concerns about the child’s best interests “resulted in rejection in the UDPCVA of 
an immediate, automatic reversion to the previous custody order following the service 
member’s return.”137  The “lag time” allows the other parent time to contest the reversion of 
custody under other state law if the parent believes the reversion is not in the best interest of 
the child.
138
  This section can be viewed as an attempt to balance fairness to all parties.  
Altogether, what the UDPCVA seeks to do is to “ensure that parents who serve their country 
are not penalized for their service, while still giving adequate weight to the interests of the 
other parent, and, most importantly, the best interest of the child.”139     
The states’ adoption of the UDPCVA is preferable to amendment of the SCRA for 
several reasons.  First, the UDPCVA is arguably more explicit in its protections for 
servicemembers.  Both the UDPCVA and the SCRA amendment prohibit courts from 
considering a parent’s past deployment or possible future deployment in itself in a child 
custody determination.
140
  Congressman Turner’s proposed SCRA amendment, however, 
requires pre-deployment custody to be reinstated “unless that is not in the best interest of the 
child.”141  The UDPCA, on the other hand, allows courts to consider any “significant 
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impact” on the best interest of the child of the parent’s past or possible future deployment.142  
Arguably, a “significant impact” on the best interests of the child is a clearer and higher 
standard than simply “not in the best interest of the child.”  It is possible there could be 
situations where a servicemember would resume physical custody under the UDPCVA 
because there was no “significant impact” but may permanently lose physical custody under 
the SCRA amendment’s vaguer standard.  Even situations like those of Michael Grantham 
and Eva Crouch may play out differently depending on the applicable law, with a potentially 
greater likelihood under the UDPCVA that the servicemembers would achieve the return of 
their children.
143
 
Additionally, the UDPCVA approach will likely placate federalist concerns.  As 
noted infra, critics’ concerns have been grounded in the idea that an amended SCRA will 
introduce federal litigation to a matter reserved to the states and in which the federal 
government has no expertise.
144
  The UDPCVA, though of course intended to provide 
uniformity across the states, ensures that child custody laws remain state law, rather than 
federal law.
145
     
Furthermore, the UDPCVA avoids altogether an argument regarding a federal right 
of action.  The Supreme Court has previously emphasized how “federal courts . . . lack the 
close association with state and local government organizations dedicated to handling issues 
that arise out of conflicts over divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.”146  Even though 
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the language of the stand-alone version of the SCRA amendment bill, H.R. 4201, explicitly 
states, “[n]othing in this section shall create a Federal right of action,”147 critics have argued 
that there are other ways counsel could get a case involving federal rights into federal 
courts.
148
  These ways include the procedure of removal to federal court pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. 1442a
149
 and possibly a declaratory judgment suit in federal court under 28 U.S.C. 
2201.
150
  Thus, because the UDPCVA would become state law once adopted, concerns 
regarding federal custody litigation would generally be averted.  
C. The Problems with the Proposed UDPCVA 
 While the ULC has the authority to propose laws, no uniform law is effective until a 
state legislature adopts it.
151
  The uniform law commissioners work toward enactment of 
ULC acts in their home jurisdictions,
152
 but all fifty states may not adopt the ULC’s 
suggested acts.  Therefore, even though the UDPCVA would facilitate some needed 
protections for servicemembers, it remains unlikely that all of the states will adopt it without 
some greater impetus to do so.  
 Indeed, several other of the ULC’s proposed schemes, in the family-law context and 
otherwise, have failed to provide the intended uniformity.  Within the family-law context, 
the 2002 Uniform Parentage Act addresses parentage determinations, including genetic 
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testing and assisted conception provisions.
153
  Only a few states and the District of Columbia 
have adopted it.
154
  The Uniform Comparative Fault Act, which provides a system of 
allocating damages in personal injury actions, is another of the many examples of proposed 
uniform schemes that the states have failed to enact.
 155
  According to the ULC’s website, 
the only states to have enacted the Uniform Comparative Fault Act are Kentucky and 
Missouri.
156
 
VI. A Proposed Solution: The Federal Government Must Encourage States’ Adoption of the 
UDPCVA 
 
  Although many of the ULC’s proposals have not been widely adopted, there are 
instances in which uniform laws have gained traction because the federal government has 
conditioned the receipt of federal funds upon the states’ adoption of the proposed law.  
Congress is able to attach conditions to the states’ receipt of federal funds because of its 
Spending Power under the United States Constitution.
157
  Though the Spending Power is 
subject to some limitations, Congress has routinely employed this power to attain states’ 
compliance with certain laws and directives.
158
  Accordingly, the best way to ensure that the 
states adopt the UDPCVA is to condition the states’ receipt of welfare funds upon their 
adoption of this uniform law.  
A. The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
and Enforcement Act: A Roadmap for the UDPCVA 
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In other notable instances, Congress has used its Spending Power to induce states 
into adopting the ULC’s recommendations.  The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act 
(“UIFSA”) and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”) 
are two examples of uniform laws that nearly all fifty states
159
 have enacted in exchange for 
federal assistance and funding.
160
  The UIFSA, first promulgated in 1992,
161
 provides 
uniform rules for the enforcement of family support orders by setting jurisdictional 
standards for state courts and “by determining the basis for a state to exercise continuing 
exclusive jurisdiction over a child support proceeding, by establishing rules for determining 
which state issues the controlling order in the event proceedings are initiated in multiple 
jurisdictions, and by providing rules for modifying . . . another state’s child support 
order.”162  In 1993, only two states had enacted the UIFSA, Arkansas and Texas.163  By the 
summer of 1996, this number totaled thirty-five states.
164
  That year was significant in the 
history of the UIFSA because the ULC then set forth significant amendments to the Act.
165
  
Even more significantly, Congress passed “welfare reform” legislation in August, the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (“PRWORA”), 
which mandated that the states enact the amended UIFSA in order to receive federal funding 
for child support enforcement.
166
  As one scholar put it, in using the PRWORA to compel 
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states to adopt the amended UIFSA, Congress “assured that nationwide acceptance of the 
amended Act was virtually certain.”167  Indeed, by 1998, all fifty states had enacted the 
UIFSA.
168
  
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”) is a 
second example of a uniform law that the states have adopted in response to Congress’s 
strategic use of its Spending Power.
169
  The ULC promulgated the UCCJEA in 1997, but 
there were other related acts that lead up to its enactment.
170
  First, the ULC promulgated the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (“UCCJA”) in 1968 with the purpose of (1) 
establishing jurisdiction over a child custody case in one state, and (2) protecting the order 
of that state from modification in any other state, as long as the original state retained 
jurisdiction over the case.
171
  States were very slow, however, to adopt the UCCJA.
172
  Only 
forty-three states had adopted some form of the UCCJA by the time Congress enacted the 
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (“PKPA”) in December 1980.173   The PKPA was “an 
effort to put the weight of full faith and credit behind the principles of the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act.”174  Eventually, by 1984, all states adopted a version of the 
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UCCJA,
175
 but differences between the UCCJA and the PKPA regarding applicable 
jurisdictional principles remained apparent.176  Therefore, in 1997, when the ULC finally 
promulgated the UCCJEA, it reconciled UCCJA principles with the PKPA and it also 
addressed interstate civil enforcement for child custody orders.
177
  Importantly, Congress 
conditioned the states’ receipt of federal assistance for children under the PRWORA on their 
adoption of the new UCCJEA.
178
  In response to Congress’s prompt, forty-nine states 
adopted the UCCJEA.
179
  The majority of states did so within four years.
180
  Overall, these 
two examples, the UIFSA and the UCCJEA, demonstrate that federal compulsion can be 
needed to lead states to efficiently adopt proposed uniform laws.  
B.  The Best Approach: The UDPCVA and Contingent Federal Funding 
 
 Though the UDPCVA is substantively the best approach to provide greater 
protections for servicemember parents in custody proceedings,
181
 its effectiveness as a 
uniform law will be eclipsed if all states do not adopt it.  Therefore, a plan must be put in 
place to ensure that all states adopt the UDPCA in a timely manner.  The states’ adoption of 
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the UIFSA and the UCCJEA demonstrates that Congress can successfully use its Spending 
Power to achieve the states’ adoption of uniform laws.182  Accordingly, Congress should use 
its Spending Power in this instance, too.  One way Congress can validly do so is to make 
funding for welfare contingent on the states’ adoption of the UDPCVA.  Since its creation 
under PRWORA in 1996, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (“TANF”) has been a 
block grant program that provides states federal funds each year to develop and maintain 
their welfare programs.
183
  TANF provides billions of dollars to the states each year.
184
  
Thus, if Congress were to condition the receipt of TANF funds on the states’ adoption of the 
UDPCVA, the states would have no viable option but to adopt the uniform law.   
C. Possible Disadvantages of the Proposed Approach 
  
 In advocating for this approach, it is necessary to address its few potential 
disadvantages.  From a critic’s perspective, the first concern may be that states will adopt 
the uniform law with variations.  The UCCJEA has been adopted in every state, for 
example, but the language of the states’ statutes varies.185  Nevertheless, this variation is 
arguably minor.  For instance, the ULC’s UCCJEA defines “commencement” of a child 
custody proceeding as “the filing of the first pleading in a proceeding.”186  By contrast, 
Wisconsin’s UCCJEA states that “commencement” means “the filing of the first pleading in 
a proceeding, provided that service is completed in accordance with the applicable 
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provisions of ch. 801.”187  As such, it is arguable that Wisconsin’s definition of 
“commencement” is slightly more restrictive than the ULC’s definition, but this is overall a 
minor distinction.  Similarly, Mississippi’s UCCJEA exemplifies slight deviation from the 
ULC’s version.  The ULC’s UCCJEA essentially establishes that exclusive jurisdiction can 
be lost in two ways, one of them being that “a court of this State or a court of another State 
determines that the child, the child’s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not 
presently reside in this State.”188  Mississippi’s exclusive jurisdiction section uses the term 
“currently do not reside.”189  It is unclear, however, that there is any significant difference.  
Overall, despite minor linguistic variations in the states’ versions, the UCCJEA still has 
been successful at achieving a high level of uniformity.
190
   
Even if the states adopt the UDPCVA with slight variations or changes in language, 
its mandated adoption in order to receive welfare funding will at least ensure that states that 
do not currently have any protections implement some.  Moreover, this proposed approach 
ideally works to ensure the states’ adoption of the core precepts of the UDPCVA, and that 
in itself would contribute to greater uniformity among the states.   
It is unlikely that Congress would ever condition federal funding on the states’ 
adoption of the exact language of the UDPCVA because of federalism concerns, mainly the 
still prevalent notion that family law should in some way be left to the states.
191
  Notably, 
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critics may argue that a uniform law with a federal requirement that states adopt it or lose 
federal funding still poses federalism problems.  The notion that the states have the 
autonomy to make slight changes to the language of their adopted uniform acts, however, 
helps to dispel federalist critique but still preserves the needed level of uniformity.  
Additionally, the ULC’s member composition suggests that the states were represented in a 
meaningful way when the ULC drafted and approved the UDPCVA.  The ULC’s members 
include lawyers, judges, legislators, and law professors who have been appointed by state 
governments to research, draft, and promote enactment of uniform state laws.
192
  While 
some may argue that the states are similarly represented in Congress in debate over the 
SCRA, Congressman Turner’s bills consistently fail to garner Senate support.193  Therefore, 
the SCRA amendment lacks from state representatives what the UDPCVA has—sufficient 
approval.   
Another concern may be that a state could still refuse to adopt the UDPCVA, as 
Massachusetts has done in failing to adopt the UCCJEA.
194
  Although Massachusetts has not 
yet adopted the UCCJEA, a bill to enact it is currently pending in its Legislature.
195
  
Additionally, a similar scenario with the UDPCVA, though admittedly possible, is unlikely 
given the financial and social consequences a state would face if it failed to adopt the 
UDPCVA.  The withholding of welfare funds that would result if a state did not adopt the 
UDPCVA is severe enough that most, if not all, states would buckle to the Congressional 
demand.  
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In sum, making funding for welfare contingent on states’ adoption of the UDPCVA 
would not be a novel approach to uniform laws within the family law realm. Instead, it 
would be an appropriate approach given the success and ubiquity of other uniform laws 
pertaining to family law through the same type of Congressional encouragement.  
Conclusion  
 With a large number of single parents serving in the military
196
 and increased 
deployments in the past several years,
197
 an abundance of reports have surfaced that many 
military servicemembers face battle overseas and return home to a battle for custody of their 
children.
198
  A servicemember may make temporary custody arrangements for his or her 
child, sometimes with the nonservicemember parent, through a non-binding family care plan 
only to return from deployment to find that the nonservicemember parent will not relinquish 
custody.  Alternatively, a nonservicemember parent may gain custody through a temporary 
order while a servicemember is deployed, despite the SCRA’s mandated stays, with the 
result that the temporary order becomes permanent upon the servicemember parent’s return 
home.  Also, there remains the possibility that in some jurisdictions “deployment” itself or 
the “potential for future deployment” will be used in the court’s best interests determination.  
 In recent years, some states have taken steps to implement laws that provide greater 
protection for servicemembers in the context of child custody disputes.  Nevertheless, these 
laws are varied and in some states they do not exist at all.  There are also serious 
inadequacies in the current Servicemembers Civil Relief Act.  There have been multiple 
attempts at passage of an amendment to the SCRA, but the lack of support in the Senate and 
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criticism from other fronts indicate that a strictly federal approach is not likely to succeed.  
In the face of this void, the ULC has proposed the Uniform Deployed Parents Custody and 
Visitation Act, which aims to standardize custody rights for military parents in child custody 
cases.  Though the UDPCVA is not guaranteed to assist every military servicemember 
fighting for his or her custodial rights, it strikes a balance that moves toward a much more 
consistent application of law in the country that these military servicemembers bravely 
serve.  Additionally, the UDPCVA will largely avoid the problems posed by SCRA 
amendment, including critic’s concerns grounded in federalism.  
State legislatures are not required to adopt uniform law proposals. Nevertheless, the 
states undoubtedly will adopt the UDPCVA if the receipt of welfare funds is made 
contingent on the states’ adoption of it.  As a result, the problem that the ULC seeks to 
address—a lack of uniformity among the states—could be ameliorated with the strategic 
encouragement of the federal government.  
   
 
